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O F F I C I A L  AND U N O F F I C I A L  DATA 
DREW W E S T E N  
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109, U.S.A. 
A b s t r a c t - -  Unofficial data are empirical findings that guide our research but 
are generally not reported. This article delineates four forms of unofficial 
data: casual observation of ourselves and others, unsystematic naturalistic 
observation, uncodable forms of clinical and phenomenological data, and 
accidental and nonquantifiable incidents and findings arising during pilot 
testing and data analysis. The article argues for a broadened conception of 
empiricism that recognizes unofficial data as data, explores the different 
contexts of the scientific process in which official and unofficial data a r e  
useful, and suggests the implications of the existence and utility of unofficial 
data for research and publication practices. 
Psychological studies are general ly r e p o r t e d  as s temming f rom,  and building 
upon ,  previous studies. In some cases this is obviously accurate,  t hough  in many  
cases - -  and near ly  always in innovative research - -  the official account  o f  the 
history o f  the theory  and  data in the in t roduct ion  section, replete  with citation o f  
the relevant  studies in the relevant  l i teratures,  reflects an Orwellian revision o f  
history. This  revision is necessary to preserve  the psychological communi ty ' s  pre-  
Kuhnian  collective myth  that  science is a cumulat ive process in which one  
study builds on the next,  with empirical  brick placed u p o n  empirical  brick until  a 
solid edifice o f  T r u t h  has been  erected.  
This  psycho-archi tectural  fantasy, unfor tuna te ly ,  fails to account  for  two 
critical materials requ i red  for  const ruct ion o f  good psychological research.  T h e  
first is the theoretical  mor t a r  that  holds the empirical  bricks in place and makes 
them less susceptible to toppl ing with the slightest wind. T h e  second is a 
founda t ion  made  o f  what  I will call unofficial data. Unofficial  data are the 
exper iences  that  lead a researcher  to pose a problem,  formula te  a concept ,  and  
pilot-test a method .  These  unofficial  data  are  typically not  cited, or  if r epor ted ,  
they are descr ibed as cute anecdotes  that  suggested the site where  the real 
scientific endeavor  was to be built. 
For  example,  I was recently piloting some research on  affective processes and  
self-representat ions,  and was t rying to c o m p a r e  the effects o f  activation of  affect- 
laden "ideal self '  schemas with activation o f  relatively neutra l  self-schemas. I 
hoped  to demons t ra t e  that a d iscrepancy be tween observation o f  one's own 
behavior  and affect- laden ideal self schemas will p roduce  affects, and con- 
sequent  responses,  which d i f fe r  f rom those evoked by a similar discrepancy 
between self-observation and self-schemas wi thout  comparab le  affective valu- 
ation. I p roceeded  to ask subjects to describe a situation in which they acted 
badly, and a situation in which they did someth ing  unusual ,  unexpec ted ,  or  out  
o f  character .  What  I found ,  to my surprise,  was that  subjects had a great  deal o f  
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difficulty recalling incidents in which they surprised themselves but did not 
evaluate this negatively. With further prodding, some subjects produced 
instances of  anomalous behavior which made them happy, but they were 
uniformly unable to produce examples to which they were affectively neutral. 
Upon completing pilot testing and putting together a codable questionnaire, I 
noticed that something curious had happened: subjects' difficulty providing 
memories of cognitively anomalous behavior that were not unpleasant had 
become a nuisance factor which I handled methodologically by tacking "but not 
bad" onto the instruction to subjects to describe an event in which they had done 
something "unusual, unexpected, or out of character." For purposes of 
publication, the interesting finding about affect and self-schemas was destined to 
become a footnote. 
I have described this event in detail not because it is unusual, but because it is 
so typical. It is not only common that in pursuing one phenomenon one observes 
another, but it is equally commonplace that the unexpected phenomenon 
becomes a nuisance that one tries to eliminate, and that it is either reported as an 
aside or is never reported at all. 
Suppose I were interested enough in this nuisance to follow it up with a study. 
One possibility would be to record reaction time of subjects trying to retrieve 
neutral, positive, and negative memories of this sort or ask them to rate relative 
difficulty of retrieval. The  likely outcome is that I would either find the expected 
relationship (and be one step closer to tenure) or find pilot results discouraging 
and abandon the project. I f  the results were positive, I would likely begin an 
article describing the study by citing the appropriate social-cognitive literature, 
and would probably not mention what had tipped me off  to the phenomenon 
because that information would be neither quantitative nor replicable. 
The initial unanticipated discovery (during piloting of  an unrelated study) 
that subjects have extreme difficulty retrieving neutral self-relevant information 
from episodic memory is an example of a class of empirical findings I will call 
unofficial data. 
An important question is what incremental knowledge is gained by perform- 
ing a study once a solid foundation has been laid of unofficial data. I f  the results 
of the study I perform are positive, while I will have some nice corroborating 
evidence, I will not have learned anything new: I already believed the 
hypothesis, I already found corroborating results piloting the study, and I would 
not have wasted precious tenure-seeking time on the study if I did not have 
reason to believe - -  estimating the probability that I am wrong at, say, 0.05? - -  
that results would be positive. If, on the other hand, the results are unpromising, 
I will indeed have learned something (either that my belief was wrong, or that I 
am a sloppy methodologist - -  my data will not tell me which), but the scientific 
community will never be any the wiser. 
Unofficial data are data that either guide research surreptitiously, or do not 
guide research but should. By contrast, official data are those empirical findings 
reportable in scientific publications, susceptible to statistical analysis and believed 
to be replicable. The aim of  this paper is to argue for a broadened conception of  
empiricism that acknowledges that both official and unofficial empirical findings 
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do, indeed, constitute data, and to suggest the uses and limitations of each. The 
article will begin by enumerating various types of unofficial data. It will then 
describe the different contexts of the scientific process in which official and 
unofficial data are most useful. It will conclude by exploring the implications of 
their complementarity for psychological practice. 
TWO KINDS OF DATA 
I will not, in a publication for professional psychologists, outline the 
characteristics of  the official data with which we are all familiar. Instead I will 
delineate several forms of  unofficial data, with which we are equally familiar, but 
of which we are sometimes officially unaware. The first is casual (i.e., 
unsystematic) observation of ourselves and others. This is probably the most 
important form of  unofficial data, largely because it provides the empirical basis 
for the implicit theories of personality that guide most psychological research. 
When Darley (Darley & Latane, 1968) began his fascinating studies of bystander 
intervention, he did so because phenomena like the public murder  of Kitty 
Genovese seemed so striking and anomalous. Surprise and anomaly, however, 
imply discrepancy between the observed and the anticipated, and the anticipated 
in this case stemmed from an intuitive sense that people tend to be at least 
somewhat concerned, empathic, altruistic, or at least civil. Darley's research is so 
interesting to us because we share his intuitive conceptions of human nature, 
although it would probably be less interesting to a fierce Nuer from the Sudan, 
whose cultural constructs about personality lead him to see such behavior as less 
surprising. 
Examples of this sort could easily be multiplied. Most social psychology is 
derived from implicit personality theories, and cognitive research would 
probably benefit from an excursion into the everyday (see Rogoff & Lave, 1984), 
to wonder, for example, how people can suspend disbelief in theater. Similarly, 
it is unlikely that social cognition researchers would ever have come to see self 
schemas as important in mediating behavior were it not for introspection. 
Perhaps we should take more seriously the view of human being as intuitive 
psychologist (Ross, 1977; with a few corrections for affect and motivation, see 
Westen, 1985) as applied to professional psychologists, who do not, and should 
not, somehow check all their accumulated unofficial knowledge about human 
beings at the door when they enter their laboratories. I am not, of course, 
suggesting that we abandon science for intuitive science, rather, that we can best 
study human beings if we are aware of  our own culturally and idiosyncratically 
constructed blinders and schemas. 
A second form of unofficial data comes from naturalistic observation. I f  
Harlow (see Harlow & Harlow, 1965) had never been to a zoo or had never read 
(or heard of) accounts of primate behavior in the wild, or if John Bowlby had 
never visited his lab and made some observations, Harlow might never have 
known that he was rearing abnormal monkeys in the laboratory. If  Lorenz 
(1952) had never noticed the way goslings follow their mothers, he would never 
have begun exploring the phenomenon of  imprinting. 
A third form includes phenomenological data; subtle, less codable aspects of 
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raw interview data; and clinical data. At times the unofficial database of clinical 
work, for example, allows the posing of questions that open avenues of more 
empirically verifiable research which could not have been foreseen without the 
initial clinical observation. Clinicians working with patients with borderline 
personality disorders (symptoms of which include unstable work history, 
difficulty maintaining intimate relationships, labile affects, and impulsive 
behavior) consistently observed that such patients have difficulty maintaining 
benignly ambivalent images of significant others, and that when stressed, they 
begin to see the world as a malevolent place, populated with people who will use, 
abuse, or abandon them. This leads to an obvious causal hypothesis, that these 
difficulties regulating and integrating emotion play a central role in producing 
difficulties in close relationships. Empirical research using projective tests has 
subsequently been addressed to the quality of object relations (or, if one prefers, 
interpersonal schemata) in such people (see Kwawer, Lerner, Lerner & 
Sugarman, 1980), and the clinical observation of these patients may begin to 
suggest some questions about the organization of cognitive-affective schemas 
more generally which could be accessible to experimental study. These questions and 
hypotheses could never have been posed without the unofficial data of clinical 
practice. What experimentally-based theory looks for the causes of certain inter- 
personal difficulties in strategies of  affect regulation, or suggests that a form of  
psychopathology could involve the storage or retrieval of  multiple experiences 
with the same stimulus (an intimate other) under  different affective valences? 
A fourth type of  unofficial data includes nonquantifiable observations during 
pilot testing, accidental findings, and responses of outliers. Our usual response 
to outliers while pilot testing is to try to refine our instruments so that they will be 
less likely to dog us in our official studies. Outliers in our official studies make us 
angry and lead us to search for ways to disqualify them for purposes of statistical 
analysis. Understanding individual  differences in response to standardized 
procedures is critical in determining the universality of the processes we are 
studying, yet in statistical accounts they are generally treated as error variance. 
Why did some of  Milgram's subjects refuse the experimenter's orders in every 
condition? One gets some insight into this by watching filmed interviews with 
subjects, but not from Milgram's data analysis. I do not mean to point a finger at 
Milgram or others in this respect, since the asterisk key on my own keyboard has 
certainly not gone untouched. 
TWO CONTEXTS OF SCIENCE 
It should now be sufficiently clear that unofficial data not only abound - -  and 
guide our research without official recognition - -  but that were we to rely only 
on the data we report, our science would be impoverished for it. I would now 
like to explore the uses and limitations of  official and unofficial data, and to 
argue that they are complementary forms of empirical data which both deserve 
official sanction. 
A useful distinction proposed earlier in this century by philosophers of science 
is between the context of  scientific discovery, in which new theories and 
hypotheses are created, and the context of  justification, in which they are put to 
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empirical test.* I will argue that unofficial data are, by and large, more useful in 
the context of discovery, and official data are more useful in the context of  
justification. 
If  one looks at the history of psychology, one uncovers the rather startling fact 
that of  the three psychologists who have probably most influenced the questions 
we ask - -  Freud, Skinner, and Piaget - -  none dealt primarily with what are now 
considered acceptable, official data. Freud's observations and theories continue 
to shape the way most psychotherapists practice. Skinner's work, largely using 
small Ns or Ns of one to try to discover new phenomena, rather than large Ns to 
try to confirm already-formed hypotheses, inspired decades of research and still 
forms a backbone of contemporary psychological thinking. While Skinner was 
clearly one of the leading mainstream psychologists of his day, it is questionable 
whether his brand of  small-N research could find a publication outlet today (and 
his speculations on personality would surely be deleted by any respectable editor, 
with the comment, "not demonstrated by your data"). Interestingly Skinner, 
psychology's most strident empiricist, has provided one of the liveliest and most 
fascinating accounts of the unofficial processes that led to his most significant 
public conclusions (1959). Similarly, Piaget was far more interested in observing 
and talking with children, formulating hypotheses, and refining them on small 
Ns than in testing his conclusions with large samples. One need only glance at 
the recent edition of  the Handbook of Child Psychology, especially Vol. 3 (Flavell & 
Markman, 1983), to see how Piaget's thought has shaped the questions asked by 
developmentalists. This is not to say that Freud, Skinner, and Piaget were right 
in all or most of  what they argued. A necessary consequence of  being someone 
who proposes bold theories that inspire research and theoretical refinement is 
that one becomes one of  the most significant purveyors of false hypotheses in the 
business. Yet the history of  psychology suggests that it is precisely those 
psychologists who immerse themselves in unofficial data that thrive in the con- 
text of  discovery and set the agenda for psychologists who prefer to wade in 
the cleaner waters of  the context of  justification. 
Indeed, it could not be otherwise. I have already suggested that we frequently 
learn little that is new from official data because we are necessarily testing pre- 
formed hypotheses that, if we have any concern for our careers, we already have 
good reason to suspect are true. (Psychology is currently shaped by an 
unfortunate process of natural selection which selects those who can produce 
quickly, which means that one is more likely to test banal, relatively simple 
hypotheses that one is certain are correct; for empirical evidence of  this selection 
of the unfit, see the studies cited by Mahoney, 1985.) It is true that psychologists 
are frequently forced to formulate new ideas when empirical researchers 
produce conflicting findings, and this is the main way that official data are useful 
in the context of  discovery. Yet if a psychologist from another planet, who had 
*Karl Popper (1965), in particular, has made much of this distinction, though he has 
tried to define the context of discovery as outside of empirical science, whereas, as 
someone influenced by Kuhn (1970), I am arguing that it is an integral part of science and 
a crucial source of empirical data. 
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no intuitive notions about  h u m a n  beings and no powers of  introspection, came 
to earth and tried to formula te  a theory of  personality based on all existing 
official data  in psychology, the theory would probably state that h u m a n  beings 
are creatures with reaction times, who as babies frequently find themselves on 
visual cliffs, who as adults (i.e., age eighteen) seem de te rmined  to fill out  
questionnaires,  and who are motivated primarily by the desire to please 
exper imenters  and to mainta in  cognitive consistency. The  only reason we, as 
earthly psychologists, tend  to believe differently is that we have access to 
unofficial data. 
In the context of  justification, the canons of  or thodox empiricism fare much  
better, and official data  are more  valuable than unofficial data. By using large 
samples one can separate the necessary f rom the contingent,  and by using 
experimental  techniques one can more easily test to see if one's causal 
hypotheses are really reducible to errors o f  inference or sampling. Even here, 
however, one must  be cautious in emphasizing the relative superiority o f  official 
data. First, the use o f  a theory by a communi ty  o f  practitioners (as in clinical 
work) is itself a selection process, however sluggish, idiosyncratic, and prone to 
false confirmation,  that  weeds out  useless ideas and preserves helpful  ones. 
Second, as has been pointed out  numerous  times, the bias toward positive 
results in publication raises serious questions about the validity o f  statistical 
probability measures that  do not  take into account the number  o f  revisions in 
pilot testing or  unpublishable  negative results. Perhaps even more  significantly, 
philosophically sophisticated empiricists, notably Sir Karl Popper  (1965), have 
emphasized that positive f indings only corroborate,  and never prove hypotheses,  
and that  only disconfirmations - -  which can always be explained away 
methodologically, or worse still, cannot  get published - -  are actually epistemolo- 
gically decisive. From a philosophical point o f  view, Hume's  problem of  
induct ion does not  suppor t  present  publication practice: after  seeing a h u n d r e d  
white swans, one can never  predict  the color of  the next swan with certainty, 
whereas if one sees a black swan, one c a n  with certainty claim that the hypothesis 
that all swans are white is false. From a more practical and historical point o f  
view, if  one studies any hypothesis  enough,  one can disconfirm aspects of  it, and 
the result o f  continual  re f inement ,  counter-studies,  and re-ref inements  in 
psychology tends to be loss o f  interest  in the hypothesis ra ther  than  increased 
positive knowledge (Meehl, 1978). 
A third caveat is that  corrobora t ion  and disconfirmation in the context  o f  
justification always involve inference,  and one can never ascertain th rough  
official data  whether  to abandon  the hypothesis or  the methodology that  failed 
to suppor t  it (see Feyerabend,  1975; Kuhn,  1970). As researchers, we tend to 
assume that our  ideas are r ight  and that  if we get negative findings, we need to 
adjust an imperfect  methodology.  As readers  or reviewers o f  papers, we typically 
assume that  null f indings (if they ever make it to print) reflect inadequate  
theories. T h e  major  de t e rminan t  o f  our  choice to reject either a theory or a 
method  is probably the degree  o f  our  emotional  investment in one or the other.  
A final caveat is that  replication, a key advantage of  official data, is largely a 
chimera.  The  percentage o f  studies actually replicated is surely less than  one 
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hundredth  of  one percent, and the percentage successfully replicated reduces that 
number  even further - -  making it far smaller, I suspect, than the number of  
times a patient will return to psychotherapy with a new clinician and receive an 
independent  and converging diagnosis of  symptoms and etiology. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOLOGY AS A SCIENCE 
Two practical implications seem to follow from the argument for the 
complementarity of  official and unofficial data, one relating to research 
practices, and the other, to publication practices. First, the field could greatly 
benefit from an official sanctioning of  interpretive and quasi-deductive tools in 
our scientific armamentarium. In the other social sciences, investigators like 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973, 1983) have put hermeneutic methods to 
good use and have consequently enriched their disciplines. Geertz's essay on 
common sense as a cultural system (1983) is a good example of  the use of  
symbolic analysis in social science, and cognitive psychology could make 
considerable use of  Geertz's analysis in forming testable hypotheses about 
everyday cognition, the influence on cognitive processes of  culturally constituted 
"common sense," and intuitive science. The  philosopher of  law H. L. A. Hart  
(1961) poses an instructive scenario: if one wished to make an empirical 
investigation of  why people stop at red lights and move forward in their 
automobiles when the light turns green, one would do well to move beyond the 
causal statement, amenable to statistical analysis, that red causes stopping and 
green causes going, by looking at people's reasons for stopping or going. This 
would require an interpretive analysis of  how people follow social rules (i.e., 
looking at the meaning of  the color based on social conventions), rather than a 
quantitative analysis of  how their behavior was caused. It is important to note 
that interpretive analysis of  this sort involves no less use of  empirical data than 
the quantitative, causal analysis officially sanctioned by the field. It does require 
more inference, but since as a field we are currently so fascinated with inference 
processes in our subjects (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980), perhaps we could show 
more interest in the inference processes of  our colleagues. 
Similarly, a social cognition researcher interested in self schemas could 
profitably complement reaction-time and questionnaire studies with a broad 
reading of  anthropological research in ethnopersonality, a subdiscipline that 
explores cultural conceptions of  self (see Westen, 1985; Shweder and Bourne, 
1982; Smith, 1978). A psychologist interested in moral development could do a 
careful exegesis, perhaps even using comparative data, of  systems of  moral belief 
embedded in myths, in order to explore the alleged universality of  certain 
patterns and the influence of  ecology and socialization on moral reasoning. 
The implications for publication follow, in part, from the implications for 
research. A comparative analysis of  representations of  self in Homer,  Lucretius, 
Flaubert, and Camus should clearly be of  interest to psychologists interested in 
the interplay of  self schemas and historical change, and should potentially be 
publishable in journals concerned with social cognition, such as the Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, Cognition, or Social Cognition. The various forms 
of  unofficial data enumerated here should be publicly acknowledged for what 
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they are - -  irreplaceable sources of  empirical data in the context  of  discovery - -  
and should be treated accordingly. Observations in the context  of  discovery 
should be repor ted  and examined  in discussion sections of  experimental  studies 
to enrich quantitative f indings and to suggest avenues for fu ture  research. 
Finally, studies that offer ,  alongside quantitative normative data  and statistical 
t reatments,  qualitative analyses of  responses of  subjects who do not conform to 
statistically corroborated results should be given priority for publication over 
similar studies that  provide no insight into individual differences.  
I am essentially a rguing  that  we make conscious our  scientific unconscious, 
which guides our  research and  our  theories whether  we are aware of  it or not. By 
making ou r  unofficial data  official, we could more clearly and self-consciously 
explore the cultural and  personal  assumptions under ly ing our  official research, 
and would therefore  be in a better  position to consider useful alternatives and 
revisions that  would otherwise remain inaccessible. 
In trying to distinguish itself f rom philosophy and gain a respectability 
comparable to the natural  sciences, psychology has swung too far in its canons o f  
method  and  has officially sanctioned a narrow form of  empiricism that  in reality 
has not, cannot ,  and should not  be institutionalized. Since the rise of  behaviorism 
in the early part  of  the century,  psychologists have treated their  own practices in 
the context  o f  discovery as a black box, report ing and acknowledging the 
existence only o f  their  final products.  It is indeed ironic that  a discipline 
current ly so preocc.upied with cognition could show SO little interest in the 
inferences, deductions,  and  analogies that  shape our  research, and the unofficial 
data that  under l ie  these complex and remarkable  cognitive events. 
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